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THE POLITICS OF MEMORY/ERRINERUNGSPOLITIK AND
THE USE AND PROPRIETY OF LAW IN THE PROCESS OF
MEMORY CONSTRUCTION
ABSTRACT. The post-Second World War trial for the crime against humanity from the
start assumed pedagogical proportions, with the tribunals involved conscious that their
legal verdicts would represent historical pronouncement and national values. The newly
defined crime has been asked to institutionalize far more than the traditional task of adju-
dicating the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The trials themselves are meant to define
the past, create and crystallize national memory, and illuminate the foundations of the
future. I suggest that, by placing a burden on law that it is not designed to bear, we risk
deforming law and legal principle. We risk creating an edifice that will not be equal to the
task of memory, that will trivialize the memory it seeks to establish and fortify and, worst
of all, that may betray law itself by subverting it from within.
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INTRODUCTION
Law and politics are not identical, yet are inseparable. This has proven to
be one of a very few reliable universals of our world. Consequently, it is
misleading to discuss law as being ‘politicized’ inasmuch as this implies an
a priori ‘un-politicized’ concept of law. Such a concept is both inaccurate
and incoherent. Additionally, to focus on the politicization of law is to
dichotomize law and politics, and consequently to examine only one aspect
of a dynamic that is of mutually interactive influence.
My topic therefore necessarily will offer an incomplete account. Never-
theless, it may be of interest because of the ideal of neutrality, objectivity
and independence from politics that has characterized, and continues to
characterize, human aspirations for law. The history of the crime against
humanity, entrenched in the legacy of Nazism, offers an opportunity to
observe mechanisms intrinsic to and pervasive in law. Analyzing crimes
against humanity yields greater visibility of some of law’s attributes in
large part because crimes against humanity catch law at an extreme point
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of rupture, as did Nazism, such that studying the crime against humanity’s
trajectory makes it possible to observe phenomena of law and society that
in less turbulent times tend to be dormant or undetectable.1
The convergence of law with political ideology was extreme in Nazi
Germany and Nazi-occupied states.2 Equally extreme was the degree of
legalism of Nazism, the degree to which Hitler Germany’s self-description,
self-representation, and to a significant extent also self-understanding, was
as a nation under law, governed by law.3 By also placing jurisprudential
concepts within Nazi law that were antithetical to traditional notions of
law, however, the Nazi régime simultaneously rendered Nazi Germany and
Nazi-occupied countries lawless, at least in one sense. The propriety of
describing that society as lawless has itself been a matter of hot dispute
since the war.4 However one comes out on this dispute, and both sides
make irrefutable points within it,5 at the least one may conclude that Nazi
Germany and occupied countries such as France maintained a mimicry of
law, such that Fascist terror was visited upon people in the name of law,
pursuant to apparently legal mechanisms, channels and structures, and not
in an overt shunning or repudiation of law.6
1 See T. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life 15, E.F.N. Jephcott,
trans., (1974) (“He who wishes to know the truth about life must scrutinize its estranged
form”).
2 See V. Grosswald Curran, “Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period
in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law”, Cornell
International Law Journal 35 (2001–2002), 101.
3 For an excellent portrayal of this complex issue, see M. Stolleis, “Reluctance to
Glance in the Mirror: The Changing Face of German Jurisprudence after 1933 and post-
1945”, in C. Joerges, ed., The Darker Legacy of European Law: Perceptions of Europe and
Perspectives on a European Order in Legal Scholarship during the Era of Fascism and
National Socialism and its Remnants (Hart, forthcoming, 2003).
4 See generally H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”,
Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), 593; L.L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: –
A Reply to Professor Hart”, Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), 630; H.L. Hart, Essays in
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, 1983).
5 For my discussion of this debate, see Curran, “Fear of Formalism”, supra n. 3. See
also D. Fraser, The Outsider Does Not See All the Game . . . : Perceptions of German Law
in the Anglo-American World, 1933–1940 (2001, manuscript on file with author).
6 One might dispute this statement to the extent that Nazi Germany and occupied
countries also had institutions that bypassed strictly legal ones. On the whole, however,
scrupulous maintenance of the structures of law and use of the channels of law and legal
institutions characterized Nazi Germany and Vichy France. See B. Rüthers, Die Unbe-
grenzte Auslegung: zum Wandel der Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus, 4th ed.
(1968, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1991); B. Rüthers, Entartetes Recht: Rechtslehren und
Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich 1939–41 (1988); and Michael Stolleis, who captures what I
mean above when he writes of rules clothed in law, supra n. 4.
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Among the many whose reaction to Hitlerism after 1945 was to pin
their hopes on depoliticizing law, with an underlying faith that law at its
core is neutral and correlates positively with justice, was Raphael Lemkin.
Lemkin was a lawyer and law professor, originally from Poland, whose
family was exterminated by Hitler because they were Jews. Lemkin coined
the term ‘genocide’, and drafted what became the U.N. Convention on
Genocide, always in the capacity as a private individual, as he had no
diplomatic or other governmental status.7
According to a recent article by Michael Ignatieff, among the many
remarkable attributes of Lemkin was his understanding Nazi genocide
from his reading of Nazi jurisprudence, not from being privy to the crit-
ical facts of the Nazis’ actual genocide.8 According to Ignatieff, at a time
when others who were privy to those facts could not bring themselves to
believe them, people such as Isaiah Berlin, Nahum Goldman and Chaim
Weizmann (all of whom would have had every personal motive to believe
the truth), Lemkin divined and believed the truth from his reading of
Nazi jurisprudence, and in the absence of the sort of concrete, factual
information that had reached Goldman, Berlin and Weizmann.9
Already in 1933 at the League of Nations’ Fifth International Confer-
ence for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Madrid, Lemkin proposed a
new sort of crime, what later he would call the crime of genocide, though
in 1933 he had not yet coined that term.10 In an article he wrote in 1947,
Lemkin described his 1933 idea.11 At that time he had formulated two new
crimes for international law, the crime of ‘barbarity’ and of ‘vandalism’,
which in 1947 he explained as follows:
[T]he present writer . . . envisaged [in 1933] the creation of two new international crimes:
the crime of barbarity, consisting in the extermination of racial, religious or social collectiv-
ities, and the crime of vandalism, consisting in the destruction of cultural and artistic works
of these groups.12
He had drafted his 1933 proposed crimes as follows:
Whosoever out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivity, or with a view to
the extermination thereof, undertakes a punishable action against the life, bodily integrity,
liberty, dignity or economic existence of a person belonging to such a collectivity, is liable,
7 See W. Korey, An Epitaph for Raphael Lemkin (2002; pre-publication monograph on
file with author).
8 M. Ignatieff, “The Danger of a World Without Enemies: Lemkin’s Word”, New
Republic, Feb. 26, 2001, at 25–28.
9 Ibid.
10 See R. Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law”, American Journal
of International Law 41 (1947), 145.
11 Ibid.
12 Lemkin, supra n. 11, at 146.
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for the crime of barbarity, to a penalty of . . . unless his deed falls within a more severe
provision of the given code.
Whosoever, either out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivity, or with
a view to the extermination thereof, destroys its cultural or artistic works, will be liable
for the crime of vandalism, to a penalty of . . . unless his deed falls within a more severe
provision of the given code.
The above crimes will be prosecuted and punished irrespective of the place where the
crime was committed and of the nationality of the offender, according to the law of the
country where the offender was apprehended.13
Lemkin was utterly unsuccessful in 1933. As William Korey describes
it in his recent monograph about Lemkin, Lemkin was treated with derision
and contempt in Madrid, especially so because, by the time of the meeting
(October, 1933), Germany’s delegates already were Nazis.14
Lemkin escaped Europe, and became a law professor at a number of
eminent United States law schools, including Duke and Columbia, but
left each of his university posts to devote his energy to the all-consuming
task of drafting what was to become the U.N. Convention on Geno-
cide, to promoting its adoption, and, finally, to tireless efforts, unavailing
during his life-time, towards United States ratification of the Convention.15
Lemkin lived to see the U.N. adopt his convention, with the name of
‘genocide’ he had given to the newly defined crime.16 He had sacrificed
his personal and professional life to this end, and died alone, completely
impoverished, and semi-starved.17
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY IN FRANCE
Today we hear an ever-growing enthusiasm in legal circles for interna-
tional tribunals and international criminal standards. The hope Lemkin and
many others cherished in 1945; namely, that formulating the crime against
genocide would prevent future genocides, proved false. Nevertheless, faith
in the positive potential of international law and criminal tribunals appears
unabated to date. Many urge universal submission to international tribunals
with the power to adjudicate crimes against humanity.18
13 Ibid.
14 Supra n. 8, at 11–13.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 For a thorough history of the origins of and connections between crimes against
humanity, genocide and war crimes in recent western legal history, see G. Levasseur, “Les
crimes contre l’humanite´ et le proble`me de leur prescription”, Journal de droit interna-
tional 259 (1966). This is not the first time in history that the world has seemed oblivious to
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The history of the crime against humanity suggests that such hope is
misplaced. If one takes as a study sample its treatment under French law,
one sees a legal system prepared to re-orient legal concepts so as to prevent
unpleasant political issues and consequences deemed politically undesir-
able. Each nation’s legal developments follow a course that has much to do
with national phenomena of a legal, social, historical and cultural nature,
so no example can pretend to universal applicability or generalization. The
many twists and turns of events in France highlight, however, the politi-
cization to which the crime against humanity is amenable and is likely to
remain amenable.
In 1964, France’s crime against humanity became ‘imprescriptible’: not
subject to a statute of limitations.19 When a new French criminal code went
into effect in 1994, it maintained the imprescriptible nature of the crime
against humanity.20 Events after the Second World War created numerous
thorny issues for France’s post-war administrations and judicial system in
cases alleging crimes against humanity, however.
The German Nazi, Klaus Barbie, was just the sort of defendant for
whom France’s crime against humanity had been prolonged to reach,
despite the passage of many decades between his crimes and his trial.
The French law on crimes against humanity was tied to the London
Accord of August 8, 1945, and Article 6 of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal, including the idea that imprescriptibility for crimes
against humanity was implied in the Nuremberg Tribunal.21 The Barbie
trial gave rise to an unexpected possibility that his defense attorney explic-
itly threatened: namely, that if Barbie were convicted of crimes he had
committed as part of the Nazi occupation on French soil, against French
people, the analogy between his conduct and France’s conduct in Algeria
would result in French defendants being deemed to have committed crimes
against humanity in Algeria in the name of France.22
the pitfalls of its legal vision for the future. See N. Berman, “But the Alternative Is Despair:
European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law”, Harvard Law
Review 106 (1993), 1792.
19 See, e.g., V. Grosswald Curran, “The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State:
Democracy’s Suicide in Vichy France”, Hastings Law Journal 50/1 (1998).
20 See Article 213–5 of CODE P ´ENAL (1994).
21 See L’arrêt Barbie, October 6, 1983 (Bull. No. 239 – Gazette du Palais 1983.2.710,
rapport C. Le Gunehec, concl. Dontenwille); and L’arrêt, 26 January 1984 (Bull. No. 34
– Gazette du Palais 1984. 1. 202, rapport C. Le Gunehec, concl. Dontenwile), both
of which are discussed in Cour de cassation (Ch. Criminelle, 1 April, 1993), Rapport
de M. le Conseiller Pierre Guerder, ‘Pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt de la Chambre
d’accusation de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 20 de´cembre 1991 (Georges Boudarel)’,
174–175 Jurisprudence 281, 286, Gazette du Palais – 1993 (1er sem.) (1993).
22 See Curran, “Legalization of Racism”, supra n. 20, at 77–78 (“Barbie’s lawyer, . . . the
renowned Jacques Verge`s, whose clients have included numerous Middle Eastern terror-
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The French judicial response was to nullify this threat by redefining
and delimiting the crime against humanity so as to avoid this previously
unforeseen possibility. The Cour de cassation thus stated that the crime
against humanity would be limited to crimes committed “in the name of a
State practicing a policy of ideological hegemony”.23 France would not be
subject to inclusion in that definition because its scope was deemed limited
to fascist-totalitarian states.24
No sooner had the French judiciary seemingly solved this problem
than another, equally unpleasant, prospect arose out of the crime against
humanity. This time the defendant was Paul Touvier, a Frenchman who
had worked for the Milice during the Vichy period. The Milice was a para-
military organization created by the Vichy government, which garnered
the reputation of Gestapo-like cruelty for its torture and its murders.25 The
new challenge concerned how the judicial decision might implicate France
for its collaborative acts during the holocaust.
The lower court dismissed the charges against Touvier pursuant to the
limitation on crimes against humanity that the Cour de cassation had
crafted in Barbie: namely, the judicial requirement that the crimes be
committed by a state practicing ‘ideological hegemony’.26 The lower court
in Touvier’s case ruled that Vichy France did not meet that criterion, so
it dismissed the charges against Touvier because Touvier had worked for
Vichy France, rather than for Nazi Germany.27
Thus, the original limiting language of the Barbie decision, designed to
immunize France from being judged for crimes against humanity based on
its conduct in Algeria, was extended in the Touvier case to avoid a judicial
confrontation with the nation’s past during the Vichy years. Paradoxically,
this ruling represented a sea change in the post-war France tenaciously
promulgated mythology about Vichy. The Touvier decision signified a
concession, never made before in official circles, that Vichy was not a
German phenomenon, since crimes committed by Nazi Germany were
within the purview of the crime against humanity, and Nazi Germany came
within the scope of a state “practicing a policy of ideological hegemony”.
ists, raised the unpleasant specter of France’s crimes in Algeria in the 1950’s, suggesting
that a guilty verdict for Barbie necessarily would augur by analogy the same result for
those responsible for crimes of torture and murder committed in France’s name during the
Algerian war of 1954–1962”.
23
‘Au nom d’un ´Etat pratiquant une politique d’he´ge´monie ide´ologique’. Cass. Crim.,
Dec. 20, 1985, 1986 J.C.P. II G, No. 20, 655, Barbie.
24 See Curran, “Legalization of Racism”, supra n. 20, at 78.
25 Ibid.
26 Arrêt de la chambre d’accustaion de Paris du 13 avril 1992.
27 Ibid.
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This implicit aspect of the court opinion contradicted the official claim,
initiated by de Gaulle and perpetuated since the time of France’s Liber-
ation, that Vichy never had been France, that it always was a German
phenomenon, a puppet state set up by Germany and carried out with
the complicity of only a few French henchmen, to the disagreement and
resistance of essentially the entire occupied nation.28
In the end, however, public outcry probably was primordial in leading
to a reversal of the lower court decision on Touvier.29 While this reversal
may have been deemed politically necessary to calm an indignant public,30
the French judiciary still managed (as it has done to date) to avoid the
issue of Vichy. It did this by introducing yet another limitation on the
French crime against humanity, holding that the act must have been
committed by a European Axis power, or by a perpetrator acting in
complicity with an Axis power.31 Henceforth, no inquiry as to whether
Vichy was an autonomous perpetrator of crimes against humanity could be
legally cognizable, and France’s judiciary would be spared the challenge
of examining and defining historical meaning and the role of France in the
holocaust.32
Although the Touvier trial was surrounded by a media blitz that equated
it with the trial of Vichy France, the charges against the defendant concen-
trated solely on his personal decision to murder Jewish hostages, impeding
any connection between his acts and the Vichy government.33 Touvier’s
conviction theoretically depended on the jury’s finding that he had acted on
behalf of Germany (or possibly Italy, a still less likely outcome), however,
since the court required the act to have been done by or for a European
Axis power.
Since so much remains implicit and unarticulated in French court
decisions, we are left to infer that, since Touvier was found guilty, he,
somehow, must have worked for Germany, rather than for France, even
28 See Curran, Legalization of Racism, supra n. 20, at 60–61; 79.
29 The public’s role was part of the complicated relation between the French executive
and judiciary. The parquet traditionally submitted to politically motivated orders from the
executive branch. In the Papon case, the Minister of Justice, Jacques Toubon, “in a state
of panic at the prospect of the public outcry likely to follow a second dismissal, asked
the prosecutor to reverse its decision and to issue instead a renvoi d’assises, an order
committing the case for trial at the trial court level”. Curran, Legalization of Racism, supra
n. 20, at 77, citing L’Express, Oct. 8, 1997, at 11–31. For the public’s involvement in
Touvier, see ibid., at 79.
30 Ibid.
31 Cass. crim. 27 novembre 1992, Touvier: JCP 1993 (ed. G, II 21977, note M. Dobkine).
32 See Curran, Legalization of Racism, supra n. 20, at 73–94.
33 Ibid.
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though the Milice was an official organization created by Vichy, with
a charter of its own.34 The Cour de cassation did not address explic-
itly whether the lower court had erred in ruling that Vichy by its nature
was autonomous, and therefore could not have committed crimes against
humanity.
The issue of Vichy’s role seemed still more difficult to avoid in the most
recent collaborator trial, that of Maurice Papon. Second in command in
the police in the Gironde, the Bordeaux area, Papon had ordered the arrest
and deportation of some 1700 Jews pursuant to orders of his superiors
in the Vichy French government. Given that Papon’s acts were state acts,
it seemed as though the Papon court would have to address directly the
issue of whether Vichy had been autonomous or a puppet government of
Germany. The Cour de cassation managed once again to avoid the issue,
however.35 The Court wrote that Papon had been “fully cognizant of the
Vichy government’s antisemitic policies”,36 but then characterized Papon’s
acts as having been performed to further Germany’s plans for genocidal
extermination:
[The] illegal arrests, imprisonments and internments, carried out at the request of the
German authorities, particularly of the Kommando der Sicherheitspolizei und der Sicher-
heitsdienst (SIPO-SD), lending its services to the Bordeaux branch of the Reichssicher-
heitshauptamt (RSHA), the Reich security organization, [the above illegal acts] were
accomplished with the active assistance of Maurice Papon, at the time the Secretary
General of the préfecture of the Gironde, who, by virtue of the wide delegation of power
accorded him by the regional préfet [i.e., the head of the préfecture], exercised authority
equally over the [several] services of the police, as well as over the running of the Mérignac
camp and services emanating from the war, such as that of Jewish Questions [i.e., an
organization set up by Pétain to accomplish the elimination of Jews from French public
and professional life and from property ownership];
[Further, Papon] fully assisted the German leadership at all stages of the operations;
namely, in preparing the arrests and in the practical organization of the convoys; . . .
Maurice Papon himself, from July, 1942 to May, 1944, delivered orders for the arrest,
internment and transfer of persons to [the] Drancy [camp]; . . . the service which he led
always sought to ensure maximum efficiency in the anti-Jewish measures that were in
his jurisdiction – such as the updating of files on Jews, or regular communication with
the [German] SIPO-SD to provide information about Jews – and sometimes even without
waiting for instructions from the central authorities of the Vichy Government, where he
requested the same [from Vichy] or from the occupier.37
34 Ibid., and sources cited therein.
35 Cass. crim., Jan. 23, 1977; Papon [arrêt No. 502], in La Semaine Juridique, No. 14,
Apr. 2, 1977, at 22812.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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The Court further redefined the crime against humanity by holding that,
contrary to the Statute of the International Military Tribunal, under French
law, the French courts can convict a defendant of crimes against humanity
even if the defendant personally and individually had not adhered to the
‘policy of ideological hegemony’. To date, the Court has remained silent
as to whether Vichy had or lacked an ideology of hegemony.
The highly political nature of the court’s rulings reflects more than
judicial aversion to confronting the issue of national history, memory and
collaboration. It also resulted from the traditional control that France’s
executive branch exerts over the judiciary, stemming, among others, from
the time of the French Revolution when the political system intentionally
relegated the judiciary to a position of inferiority,38 and reinforced by the
power de Gaulle was able to infuse into the executive branch in post-war
French government.
The turns and twists of Papon’s trial were endless and too numerous
to recount here.39 They were buffeted on the one hand by the executive
branch’s wish to delay and ultimately avoid trials that risked involving
France’s crimes during Vichy; and, on the other hand, by the winds of
public opinion, including an erupting, irrepressible curiosity about Vichy
and its national significance to French youth. Governmental delay tactics
gave way eventually to the public’s clamor to see Papon stand trial, but the
decades-long nature of the delays meant that almost everyone of relev-
ance, other than Papon himself, was dead, including Sabatier, Papon’s
supervisor, who proclaimed before he died that it was he who had had
full responsibility for the crimes attributed to Papon.40
French official reactions to Vichy have undergone numerous vicis-
situdes, including President Chirac’s reversal of position by declaring that
Vichy was French after all. Moreover, the issues of property expropriated
or ‘spoliated’ under confiscatory Aryanization laws, which recently were
the basis of class action law suits initiated in United States courts, further
intensified France’s attention to its past. The issue of Vichy is far from
over. It is clear that Vichy will not go away, no matter what the courts
38 See, e.g., Curran, “Fear of Formalism”, supra n. 3, at 141.
39 I discuss them in detail in Curran, “Legalization of Racism”, supra n. 20, at 73–94.
The latest twist occurred on July 24, 2002, when the European Court of Human Rights
vindicated Papon and condemned France for having denied him his right of appeal. The
Cour de cassation must meet in plenary session now to adjudicate on Papon’s renvoi
(appeal).
40 See Curran, “Legalization of Racism”, supra n. 20, at 73–94. Indeed, it is one of the
more bizarre judicial twists of this story that at one point the court decided to dismiss all
charges against Papon, not because it deemed him innocent, but solely because it had been
a mistake not to have indicted Sabatier also. See ibid.
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do, and French society as a whole is becoming more receptive to self-
examination. Less clear is whether the courts can offer the appropriate
forum for France’s coming to terms with it.41 It is perhaps preferable that
the debate take place in a wider arena.
Algeria also will not “go away”. Both Vichy and Algeria are like
palimpsests, texts smothered by superimposed layers of history and
rewritten texts, but slowly and inexorably penetrating through all of the
smothering texts to surface after all, in a writing that must be decoded by
new generations. Perhaps not coincidentally, the two periods are linked by
the person of Vichy collaborator Maurice Papon. His career under Vichy
was a prelude, not an impediment, to future professional successes and
eminence. Papon eventually became a cabinet minister under Mitterrand.
Before then, in the 1960s, he rose to become préfet de police in Paris.
During that tenure, he ordered the torture and massacre of Algerians in
France.42
On a legal level, despite the judicial contortions of the crime against
humanity that would have seemed to have removed France from the
potential onus of crimes against humanity, France’s conduct in Algeria
erupted into scandal last year with the publication of a book by
General Aussaresses, Services spéiaux: Algérie 1955–1957.43 The General
recounts in detail that he tortured Algerians as part of France’s military
policy in Algeria. The book sports a prominent band with an unoffi-
cial subtitle added by the publisher: “My testimony on torture” (“Mon
témoignage sur la torture”). A dual scandal has raged in France since its
publication. On the one hand, the book recounts in detail what has been
known for about fifty years, but had not been documented so irrefutably
before. On the other hand, the author is not revealing his own conduct in
order to indict France; on the contrary, he is completely unrepentant.44
Official response has been ambiguous. President Chirac immediately
withdrew General Aussaresses’s Légion d’honneur. Whether that act signi-
fied repudiation of the torture, or, rather, of the telling about the torture,
is an issue of interpretation. A recent editorial in Paris Match put it this
way: “What are we indignant about? About the confession of the old
General Aussaresses about torture in Algeria. Or about the public exhib-
41 See Ibid., at 73–96.
42 See P. Vidal-Naquet, Me´moires: Le trouble et la lumie´re 1955–1998, 150 (1998);
Jean-Luc Einaudi, Octobre 1961. Un Massacre a` Paris (2001).
43 P. Aussaresses, Services spe´ciaux: Alge´rie (1955–1957) (2001).
44 See id. Aussaresses has declared his endorsement of torture verbally in numerous
interviews and public appearances since the publication of his book. See also B. Vital-
Durand, “Le Proce`s du ge´ne´ral Aussaresses: Un tortionnaire juge´ pour ses mots”,
Libe´ration, 26 Nov. 2001.
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ition of those crimes. Is it the torture that repels or its revelation that
scandalizes?”45
Predictably, part of the French public is clamoring for the trial of
General Aussaresses for crimes against humanity.46 As with Papon, it is
the only serious crime which would not be dismissed, because all others
would violate a statute of limitations.47 Even the more suitable war crime
(“crime de guerre”) has been subject to a statute of limitations in France
to date, because, notwithstanding France’s having signed the European
Convention of January 25, 1974 on the imprescriptability of war crimes,
France’s Parliament still has failed to ratify the Convention.48 Moreover,
the French law of 1964 that took crimes against humanity outside the scope
of limitations periods “clearly limited imprescriptability solely to crimes
against humanity, to the exclusion of war crimes”.49
In another French court decision that followed on the heels of the
Touvier case, the Cour de cassation interpreted Touvier as categorically
limiting crimes against humanity under French law to acts committed by or
for a European Axis power, and more specifically excluded acts committed
in the far east.50 As a legal commentator put it in that case, Boudarel, the
Touvier decision of 27 November 1992 had “formally distinguished the
45 A. Genestar, “Torture, la fin de la quarantaine”, Paris-Match, May 17, 2001 (“De
quoi s’indigne-t-on? Des aveux du vieux ge´ne´ral Aussaresses sur la torture en Alge´rie. Ou
de l’exhibition publique de ces crimes. Est-ce la torture qui re´vulse ou sa re´ve´lation qui
scandalise?”).
46 See ibid. [Genestar, edit’l in Paris-Match].
47 The courts did find another criminal violation, and Aussaresses has undergone the
first proceeding. See infra.
48 See Rapport de M. le Conseiller Pierre Guerder, “Pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt
de la Chambre d’accusation de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 20 de´cembre 1991 (Georges
Boudarel)”, 174–175 Jurisprudence 281, 286, Gazette du Palais – 1993 (1er sem.) (1993);
E. Conan, “Aussaresses: plaines en souffrances”, l’Express, May 24, 2001, at 23. On the
distinction between crimes against humanity and war crimes, see G. Levasseur, “Les crimes
contre l’humanite´ et le proble`me de leur prescription”, 1966 Journal de droit international
259, 260, 271 (1966).
49 Rapport de M. le Conseiller Pierre Guerder, “Pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt de
la Chambre d’accusation de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 20 de´cembre 1991 (Georges
Boudarel)”, 174–175 Jurisprudence 281, 284, Gazette du Palais – 1993 (1er sem.) (1993).
(“La loi du 26 de´cembre 1964, en constatant l’imprescriptibilite´ des crimes contre
l’humanite´, ‘tels qu’ils sont de´finis par la re´solution des Nations Unies du 13 fe´vrier 1946,
prenant acte de la de´finition des crimes contre l’humanite´, telle qu’elle figure dans la
Charte du Tribunal international du 8 août 1945’, a clairment restreint l’imprescriptibilite´
aux seuls crimes contre l’humanite´, a` l’exclusion des crimes de guerre”.) (Citing J.
Francillon, Jurisclasseur Pe´nal Annexes, Fasc. 410, no. 140, and sources cited therein).
50 Cour de cassation (Ch. criminelle, 1 April, 1993), Rapport de M. le Conseiller Pierre
Guerder, supra n. 50.
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Vichy régime from the Rome-Berlin Axis powers; namely, Germany and
Italy (to which it perhaps is apposite to add their European allies, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania)”.51
The Boudarel case was to reach France’s highest court, but it involved
crimes against humanity allegedly committed outside of Europe, in a war
unrelated to European Axis powers; namely, France’s conflict in Vietnam.
Boudarel was a Frenchman who had deserted the French army in Vietnam,
proceeding to join the Communist Viêt-Minh, and to torture French pris-
oners of war, participating and often directing their systematic starvation
and political brainwashing.52 The opinion of the rapporteur of the Cour
de cassation in Boudarel concluded that the Touvier decision of 1992 had
limited “the field of application of the Nuremberg Charter to the Axis
powers and their accomplices”.53
The Boudarel case suggests that the French judiciary will not try
Aussaresses for crimes against humanity because only crimes against
humanity committed in the course of the Second World War, and excluding
the Orient, can come within the scope of imprescriptability.54 Moreover,
the Boudarel Court further held that, even if the nature of the crimes
committed by Boudarel did qualify as crimes against humanity, they were
not cognizable because all acts arising out of the Vietnam conflict had
been amnestied pursuant to Article 30 of the law of 18 June 1966.55 This
last reason also would seem determinative for Aussaresses inasmuch as a
similar amnesty law was passed with respect to all acts committed during
the Algerian conflict.56 Indeed, in a previous decision, the Court of cassa-
tion had ruled that the Algerian amnesty barred a lawsuit brought in the
Yacoub case, in which the plaintiff had alleged crimes against humanity in
connection with that conflict.57
51 Ibid. (“Ainsi le re´gime de Vichy a e´te´ distingue´ formellement des puissances de
l’Axe Rome-Berlin, c’est-a`-dire de l’Allemagne et l’Italie (auxquelles il convient peut-être
d’ajouter leurs allie´s europe´ens, Hongrie, Boulgarie, Roumanie”.))
52 See Boudarel decision, supra n. 51.
53 Ibid., at 284 (“Le champ d’appliation de la charte de Nuremberg a e´te´ limite´ aux
puissances de l’Axe, et a` leurs complices”).
54 See Cour de cassation (Ch. criminelle), 1er avril 1993, in Gazette du Palais 1993 (1er
sem.), 24 June, 1993, at 289–290.
55 Ibid., at 290.
56 See Ordonnance no. 62–248 of 14 August 1962; and law of 31 July 1968, discussed
in Rapport de M. le Conseiller Pierre Guerder, Pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt de
la Chambre d’accusation de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 20 de´cembre 1991 (Georges
Boudarel), 174–175 Jurisprudence 281, 288–289 Gazette du palais – 1993 (1er sem.)
(1993).
57 Cour de cassation (Ch. Criminelle), 29 November, 1988, appeal no.87-80/566, D.
1991, discussed in Cour de cassation (Ch. Criminelle, 1 April, 1993), and Rapport de
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The latest and no doubt least expected consequence of the Aussaresses
debate has seen the filing of a complaint on August 30, 2001 against
France for crimes against humanity after all, not by the Algerians whom
France’s military tortured, but by the opposite camp: the Harkis, a pro-
French Algerian group, allied with France during the war in Algeria,
claiming to have been tortured by the nationalist FLN Algerians after
France pulled out of Algeria pursuant to the Evian agreements in 1962.
They are suing France in a Paris court, the tribunal de grande instance de
Paris, on the argument that, when France pulled out of Algeria, it knew or
should have known that the FLN Algerian nationalists would massacre the
Harkis.58 It is estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 of them were
murdered.59
Under a strict jurisprudential analysis, the Harki claim should fail due to
the amnesty of Algerian conflict crimes; the inapplicability of the impre-
scriptability criminal code provision to war crimes; and, finally, the fact
that the allegations themselves do not accuse the French of the act of
murder. Rather, the complaint alleges that crimes against humanity are
legally attributable to France even though France’s enemies, the FLN
Algerians, committed them, not Frenchmen and not persons acting under
orders from, or on behalf of, France. On the other hand, the public outcry
to expand the crime against humanity beyond acts of the Second World
War is considerable, and it is not clear that the crime against humanity
might not be about to change, particularly since the Cour de cassation in
the Boudarel case left the door open to this possibility by suggesting that
amnesty laws may not apply to crimes that qualify in substantive nature as
crimes against humanity.60
In the closely knit relation of law to politics, France’s courts have
sought to appease the public outcry arising from the Aussaresses book by
hauling General Aussaresses and his publisher into court, not for crimes
against humanity, but for a little used violation of the criminal code. The
author and his publisher were charged with “complicity for apologizing
for war crimes”, a délit de presse (press violation).61 The Court focused
on whether the book “incited readers to reach a favorable moral judgment”
M. le Conseiller Pierre Guerder, “Pourvoi en cassation contre l’arrêt de la Chambre
d’accusation de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 20 de´cembre 1991 (Georges Boudarel)”,
174–175 Jurisprudence 281, 288–289 Gazette du Palais – 1993 (1er sem.) (1993).
58 See L. Chabrun, A. Lenoir and T. Varela, “La plainte des harkis est-elle justifie´e?”, in
L’Express, 30 (August, 2001), at 12–14.
59 See ibid., at 12.
60 See Boudarel, supra n. 51, at 289–290; J.-H. Robert, Note, 38 Lois pe´nales annexes,
J.-Cl. Pe´nal Annexes, at 10 (February, 1994).
61 Article 24, Code Pe´nal Dalloz, at 1679, 1684.
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about the matters Aussaresses recounted.62 This may have served the expi-
atory function of the trial in the manner René Girard believes to be the
primary function of trials: the institutionalization of cathartic channelling
of popular emotions that otherwise would threaten a polity’s stability.63
The judicial setting was devoid of legal and political consequences
for anyone but a defendant reviled by every side, whether because he
“spilled the beans” on France’s murderous practices in Algeria, or, for
the other side, because he personally and unrepentantly committed torture
and murder. The judiciary oversaw a discussion of France’s practices in
Algeria so confined by the delimitations of the criminal charge that had
been brought, that no argument connected to crimes against humanity was
legally cognizable within it. The tribunal correctionel de Paris decided
that Aussaresses’ crime lay in the book’s justifying the methods used in
Algeria, and that one does not have the right to say everything in the name
of freedom of expression.64 France’s role in Algeria and towards Algerians
was not an issue except at a remote, metatextual level.
From the trials of Nazi collaborators to Algerian torturers, the crime
against humanity has been handled by the courts of France with every
attention to the political message and political consequences of adjudic-
ation. When one thinks of the faith Raphael Lemkin placed in law, perhaps
one should be glad that he died shortly after what he still was able to
experience as a moment of triumph, presaging, as he saw it, a future of
justice under law.
CONCLUSION
The crime against humanity has not changed in nature, nor has it changed
in definition, but its judicial application is at the mercy of the politics of
those who interpret it. The context for law and law’s meaning is society,
and “a certain type of discourse dominates the public debates to the
point of preventing the multitude from hearing any point of view which
would not share the assumptions and the formal structure of that dominant
62
‘100,000 F d’amendes requis contre Paul Aussaresses’, Le Monde, Nov. 28, 2001
(http://www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3226-249079-,00.html).
63 See R. Girard, La Violence et le sacre´ (1972).
64 I am translating almost word for word the report on November 29, 2001 on French
television of the November 28, 2001 court proceeding. (TV-5). For the French view on the
limitations appropriate to freedom of expression, see A. Kaplan, The Collaborator: The
Trial and Execution of Robert Brasillach (2000); P. Watts, Allegories of the Purge: How
Literature responded to the Post-War Trials of Writers and Intellectuals in France (1998).
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discourse”.65 When those assumptions are themselves incompatible with
fundamental principles of human rights, legal concepts such as the crime
against humanity will not be adjudicated onto serve humanitarianism.
Raphael Lemkin understood the truth of Nazi jurisprudence, but he
forgot its most profound truth. The political philosopher, Ernst Cassirer,
understood it better. In 1946 Cassirer wrote that legal concepts and legal
texts “have no real binding force, if they are not the expression of [what] is
written in the citizens’ minds. Without this moral support the very strength
of a state becomes its inherent danger”.66 His words apply equally well to
supra- and international legal orders, and we would do well to heed them
today.
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66 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, 76 (1946).

